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Filter by Tags Reports & Analysis Original reporting by the Afgha n Witness team 13 May 2024 ISKP: Group re-emerges after two-month gap in activity After a two-month hiatus in ISKP activity, the group resumed attacks in Kandahar, Kunar, Kabul, and Herat, targeting critical infrastructure and Shia communities, highlighting the group’s ongoing presence and capabilities in Afghanistan. Read here 13 May 2024 NRF and AFF: Joint event and increased attacks in Kabul NRF and AFF jointly commemorated fallen commanders in their first shared online event, where leaders emphasised the need for unity; both groups have intensified their activity in Kabul in recent months, but while the NRF notably increased attacks during Ramadan, the AFF announced a suspension of operations. Read here 30 Apr 2024 Gulbuddin Hekmatyar relocated from state-owned land by Taliban officials According to the Taliban, the land that Hizb-e Islami party leader Hekmatyar was living on had been provided by the Republican government and was not legitimate, as recognising it as such would imply recognition of the previous administration. Read here 11 Apr 2024 Taliban issues further restrictions on Afghan female journalists in TV and radio In Kabul, female presenters were reportedly told to appear on air only in full veiling, while in Khost, local media was prohibited from broadcasting calls from women and girls. Read here 4 Apr 2024 Afghan media outlet Etilaatroz launch fact-checking unit as a result of Afghan Witness partnership The Etilaatroz team have been working steadily with AW to learn fact-checking methodologies and develop open source skills. Read here 13 May 2024 Media environment: Two outlets suspended and other journalists arrested The Afghan media landscape has been under sustained pressure since the Taliban takeover, with the closure of two TV channels linked to political parties and a series of journalist detentions in recent weeks, indicating the Taliban's ongoing efforts to control the media landscape. Read here 30 Apr 2024 Audio clip from Taliban leader addresses stoning of Afghan women In audio clips circulated online in March, the Taliban’s Supreme Leader emphasised the strict implementation of Sharia punishments and spoke of harsher punishments for women. Read here 22 Apr 2024 Rising reports of femicide: new digital map documents cases of violence and repression of Afghan women in ‘public’ roles Female-led newsroom Zan Times used investigative reporting and open source techniques to document killings, disappearances and arrests of Afghan women. Read here 10 Apr 2024 Afghan women protest Taliban’s policies on International Women’s Day Afghan Witness has seen a downturn in street protests, with many women taking their protests indoors and online in an attempt to avoid suppression or violence. Read here 28 Mar 2024 Pakistani airstrikes in Afghanistan prompt retaliatory actions from Taliban Pakistan stated the strikes were directed at militant group members located in Afghanistan, while the Afghan Taliban claimed that civilian residential areas were hit. Afghan Witness confirmed the deaths of several children following the strikes and verified retaliatory shelling and gunfire from Afghan forces towards Pakistani territory. Read here View More

To survey How to use our map View map Home: Our Misson Latest Reports NRF and AFF: Joint event and increased attacks in Kabul NRF and AFF jointly commemorated fallen commanders in their first shared online event, where leaders emphasised the need for unity; both groups have intensified their activity in Kabul in recent months, but while the NRF notably increased attacks during Ramadan, the AFF announced a suspension of operations. ISKP: Group re-emerges after two-month gap in activity After a two-month hiatus in ISKP activity, the group resumed attacks in Kandahar, Kunar, Kabul, and Herat, targeting critical infrastructure and Shia communities, highlighting the group’s ongoing presence and capabilities in Afghanistan. Media environment: Two outlets suspended and other journalists arrested The Afghan media landscape has been under sustained pressure since the Taliban takeover, with the closure of two TV channels linked to political parties and a series of journalist detentions in recent weeks, indicating the Taliban's ongoing efforts to control the media landscape. Audio clip from Taliban leader addresses stoning of Afghan women In audio clips circulated online in March, the Taliban’s Supreme Leader emphasised the strict implementation of Sharia punishments and spoke of harsher punishments for women. Gulbuddin Hekmatyar relocated from state-owned land by Taliban officials According to the Taliban, the land that Hizb-e Islami party leader Hekmatyar was living on had been provided by the Republican government and was not legitimate, as recognising it as such would imply recognition of the previous administration. Rising reports of femicide: new digital map documents cases of violence and repression of Afghan women in ‘public’ roles Female-led newsroom Zan Times used investigative reporting and open source techniques to document killings, disappearances and arrests of Afghan women. Taliban issues further restrictions on Afghan female journalists in TV and radio In Kabul, female presenters were reportedly told to appear on air only in full veiling, while in Khost, local media was prohibited from broadcasting calls from women and girls. Afghan women protest Taliban’s policies on International Women’s Day Afghan Witness has seen a downturn in street protests, with many women taking their protests indoors and online in an attempt to avoid suppression or violence. Afghan media outlet Etilaatroz launch fact-checking unit as a result of Afghan Witness partnership The Etilaatroz team have been working steadily with AW to learn fact-checking methodologies and develop open source skills. Pakistani airstrikes in Afghanistan prompt retaliatory actions from Taliban Pakistan stated the strikes were directed at militant group members located in Afghanistan, while the Afghan Taliban claimed that civilian residential areas were hit. Afghan Witness confirmed the deaths of several children following the strikes and verified retaliatory shelling and gunfire from Afghan forces towards Pakistani territory. Accounts impersonating female journalists share pro-Taliban content Many of the impersonator accounts identified by Afghan Witness repeatedly use derogatory language toward the Afghan LGBTQIA+ community and attempt to defame activists and news anchors in exile. ISKP claim responsibility for attack outside Kandahar bank According to the group’s statement, a suicide bomber targeted Taliban members withdrawing their salaries. Reports cite conflicting casualty figures, though a source at a hospital claimed 21 individuals were killed in the attack. More Reports In the Press Home: Who we are For Witnesses For journalists Anchor 1 Home: Contact Strengthening reporting Our database of verified information is available in the form of the interactive Afghan Witness Map , designed to support journalists, researchers and policymakers in their reporting and analysis. Further data from our database of visual evidence and claims is also shared with organisations and journalists upon request. While our work is rooted in open source verification, our interviews with Afghans from a variety of backgrounds shed light on the impacts of the issues we monitor daily. These testimonies are available in an anonymised form for journalists and international media to report on. Get in Touch For Witnesses We provide a secure solution for anyone who has witnessed a human rights incident in Afghanistan and wants to ensure their digital evidence is recorded, analysed and stored in order to hold perpetrators to account. Afghan Witness will investigate and, where possible, verify information submitted through the portal. Evidence can be uploaded anonymously – safeguarding the identities of witnesses and those providing information is of the utmost importance. Upload Evidence View map Subscribe below for in-depth reports, stories, and our monthly newsletter. First name Enter your email address I agree to the terms & conditions View terms of use Subscribe Thanks for submitting! Top of Page Strengthening the information environment Part of our work focuses on building community and strengthening the capabilities of the Afghan diaspora and international organisations to collect, analyse and record information in a way that is verifiable and in accordance with international accountability mechanisms. We do this through training, collaboration, skill swapping, information sharing and through our grants and fellowship program.

NRF and AFF: Joint event and increased attacks in Kabul NRF and AFF jointly commemorated fallen commanders in their first shared online event, where leaders emphasised the need for unity; both groups have intensified their activity in Kabul in recent months, but while the NRF notably increased attacks during Ramadan, the AFF announced a suspension of operations. 13 May 2024 Photo: © Afghan Witness On 13 April 2024, the Afghanistan Freedom Front (AFF) convened a virtual meeting to commemorate the first anniversary of the loss of their prominent commanders, Akmal Ameer, Abdul Basir Andarabi, and five of their fellow fighters. The Taliban killed these fighters in a raid in Parwan province’s Salang district in April 2023. The online meeting was attended by AFF leader Yasin Zia and National Resistance Front (NRF) leader Ahmad Massoud. Other participants included former parliamentarian and university Professor Mohaiuddin Mahdi, former Spokesman for the Afghan National Defence and Security Forces (ANDSF) General Ajmal Omar Shinwari, former Governor of Takhar Mawlawi Abdullah Qarluq, and former Director of Criminal Investigation Department (CID) of the Ministry of Interior Bismillah Taban. Attendees also included Parwana Ibrahimkhel and Razia Barakzai , representatives of Afghanistan’s women’s protest movement, former parliamentarian Mohammad Azim Mohseni, and the former Governor of Zabul, Rahmatullah Yarmal. Figure: Screenshot of the online meeting showing leaders of two main resistance fronts, Ahmad Massoud (bottom right) and Dr Yasin Zia (top left). AW notes that this marks the first time that Massoud and Zia, leaders of the two major anti-Taliban armed resistance factions, participated in a shared online gathering. According to pro-resistance journalist Asar Hakimi , the two leaders’ simultaneous participation “symbolised a resolute commitment to joint efforts for Afghanistan's freedom from Taliban control.” In his address , published on the Azadagan YouTube channel, NRF leader Massoud underscored that the Taliban left no alternative for their opposition but warfare. He emphasised the prevalence of fraudulent NRF-affiliated accounts disseminating propaganda – aimed at undermining other resistance fronts, notably the AFF – as a component of the Taliban’s cyber warfare tactics. He stressed the imperative of solidarity among anti-Taliban resistance factions, claiming that anyone opposing their common enemy (the Taliban) was regarded as a comrade. “Today, if anyone throws a stone at the enemy, he is one of us; he is dear to us and is by our side,” he said. He added that he envisioned a future marked by a liberated and sovereign Afghanistan, built on the pillars of unity and the continuity of resistance. In his speech , shared on X (formerly Twitter), AFF leader Zia commended the sacrifices made by members of resistance forces in their struggle against the Taliban. He asserted that the Taliban's proclaimed victory was not genuine, but rather the result of striking a deal with the US to attain power. Zia reiterated the necessity of armed resistance as the sole recourse against the Taliban, and stressed the importance of unity among all anti-Taliban resistance factions to achieve victory. He encouraged all Afghans to rally behind resistance forces; he said that while civilians may eventually join the cause, he urged that it was wiser to join sooner rather than later. In her address , women’s rights activist Ibrahimkhel highlighted the significance of women’s protests against the Taliban, describing them as complementary to the armed resistance efforts led by the NRF and AFF against the Taliban. While the NRF leader consistently lauds the courage and resilience of women activists in their struggle against the Taliban, AW notes that this event marks the first time that women protesting against the Taliban have openly acknowledged their efforts as complementary to armed resistance against Afghanistan’s de facto authorities. On 16 April 2024, in a rare move, the AFF echoed the stance of the NRF by reposting an official statement from January 2024, denouncing any attempts to sow discord among resistance factions as tactics of the Taliban. In the referenced post , along with screenshots of NRF’s verified social media accounts, the group reiterated that only the accounts depicted in the screenshots truly represent the NRF. The last instance of AFF reposting NRF content occurred in March 2023, when the group endorsed the NRF’s announcement of a spring offensive. AW notes that some alleged pro-resistance social media accounts, one of which misuses the NRF logo, aim to foster disunity and conflict between the NRF and AFF by spreading propaganda against the latter. AW also observed that some pro-NRF accounts disseminated an audio file on 18 April 2024, purportedly attributed to AFF leader Zia, in which Zia allegedly claims that the anti-Taliban resistance front conducting the most attacks should assume leadership of the resistance, with other factions following it. The audio message further suggests that leadership should be determined by merit rather than lineage. While AW confirmed the authenticity of this recording with local sources, AW learned that this was not a new recording, suggesting that it was likely being reshared to sow discord between resistance groups. Although this kind of online behaviour appears to represent a concerted effort to undermine solidarity among anti-Taliban resistance groups, AW was unable to verify Taliban involvement in these activities. AFF and NRF increased activity in Kabul AFF and NRF are the most active resistance groups in Afghanistan, with numerous verified attacks targeting Taliban members in the past years. By the end of 2023, the two groups were reporting activity in a wide range of locations , mostly focused on the northeast of the country, with various overlapping provinces. At the start of 2024, and with the impending arrival of the spring fighting season, both groups increased their military efforts in the capital. Between 11 January 2024 and 30 April 2024, the AFF and NRF claimed 44 attacks against Taliban targets across 12 police districts (PD) in Kabul city. The majority were documented by the groups, with footage uploaded to their official X accounts . Although AW was only able to verify a sample, due to many of the attacks occurring at nighttime, with limited visibility, there is little reason to believe the claims were fraudulent. The footage shows no signs of editing and the content, which featured the explosions, has not been previously encountered on social media. The map of Kabul below shows the number of claimed attacks, from both AFF and NRF, per PD, between 11 January 2024 and 30 April 2024. The groups appear to be focusing their operations on the centre and northern area of the capital. It is noteworthy that NRF claimed attacks in six PDs that had no recent reported activity by the AFF, meanwhile the AFF did not claim any attacks in PDs not already targeted by the NRF. Figure: Number of attacks claimed by AFF and NRF in each police district of Kabul, between 11 January and 30 April 2024. Despite an increase in attacks targeting Kabul since the start of 2024, the two resistance groups chose to deal with the period of Ramadan very differently. The NRF showed a significant increase in attacks, moving from one claimed operation in the four-week period before Ramadan, to 16 during the holy month; meanwhile, the AFF announced a suspension of operations during Ramadan. The graph below highlights this difference. Figure: Number of claimed attacks performed by AFF and NRF resistance groups in Kabul, between 11 January and 30 April 2024, highlighting the Ramadan period between 11 March and 10 April 2024. Despite having a common enemy and overlapping areas of operation, the two resistance groups appear to have different priorities, which translated into contrasting decisions regarding attacks in Kabul during Ramadan. Share

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Reports and Analysis Original reporting by the Afghan Witness team 13 May 2024 ISKP: Group re-emerges after two-month gap in activity After a two-month hiatus in ISKP activity, the group resumed attacks in Kandahar, Kunar, Kabul, and Herat, targeting critical infrastructure and Shia communities, highlighting the group’s ongoing presence and capabilities in Afghanistan. Read more 13 May 2024 Media environment: Two outlets suspended and other journalists arrested The Afghan media landscape has been under sustained pressure since the Taliban takeover, with the closure of two TV channels linked to political parties and a series of journalist detentions in recent weeks, indicating the Taliban's ongoing efforts to control the media landscape. Read more 13 May 2024 NRF and AFF: Joint event and increased attacks in Kabul NRF and AFF jointly commemorated fallen commanders in their first shared online event, where leaders emphasised the need for unity; both groups have intensified their activity in Kabul in recent months, but while the NRF notably increased attacks during Ramadan, the AFF announced a suspension of operations. Read more 30 Apr 2024 Audio clip from Taliban leader addresses stoning of Afghan women In audio clips circulated online in March, the Taliban’s Supreme Leader emphasised the strict implementation of Sharia punishments and spoke of harsher punishments for women. Read more 30 Apr 2024 Gulbuddin Hekmatyar relocated from state-owned land by Taliban officials According to the Taliban, the land that Hizb-e Islami party leader Hekmatyar was living on had been provided by the Republican government and was not legitimate, as recognising it as such would imply recognition of the previous administration. Read more 22 Apr 2024 Rising reports of femicide: new digital map documents cases of violence and repression of Afghan women in ‘public’ roles Female-led newsroom Zan Times used investigative reporting and open source techniques to document killings, disappearances and arrests of Afghan women. Read more 11 Apr 2024 Taliban issues further restrictions on Afghan female journalists in TV and radio In Kabul, female presenters were reportedly told to appear on air only in full veiling, while in Khost, local media was prohibited from broadcasting calls from women and girls. Read more 10 Apr 2024 Afghan women protest Taliban’s policies on International Women’s Day Afghan Witness has seen a downturn in street protests, with many women taking their protests indoors and online in an attempt to avoid suppression or violence. Read more 4 Apr 2024 Afghan media outlet Etilaatroz launch fact-checking unit as a result of Afghan Witness partnership The Etilaatroz team have been working steadily with AW to learn fact-checking methodologies and develop open source skills. Read more 28 Mar 2024 Pakistani airstrikes in Afghanistan prompt retaliatory actions from Taliban Pakistan stated the strikes were directed at militant group members located in Afghanistan, while the Afghan Taliban claimed that civilian residential areas were hit. Afghan Witness confirmed the deaths of several children following the strikes and verified retaliatory shelling and gunfire from Afghan forces towards Pakistani territory. Read more Load more

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ISKP: Group re-emerges after two-month gap in activity After a two-month hiatus in ISKP activity, the group resumed attacks in Kandahar, Kunar, Kabul, and Herat, targeting critical infrastructure and Shia communities, highlighting the group’s ongoing presence and capabilities in Afghanistan. 13 May 2024 After a two-month lull in ISKP attacks, the group claimed responsibility for a suicide bombing in front of the New Kabul Bank in Kandahar on 21 March 2024. Since then, the group has claimed multiple other attacks, including in Kunar, Kabul, and Herat. Attacks on critical infrastructure and Shias in Kabul On 9 April 2024, ISKP claimed responsibility, via its Telegram channels, for the detonation of an Improvised explosive device (IED) explosion at a fuel tanker in the Qala-e Murad Beg area, at the northern gate of Kabul city. The attack resulted in a large fire , however AW did not identify any reports of casualties following the detonation. AW notes that the explosion marks the first ISKP attack targeting critical infrastructure since May 2022. Prior to this incident, ISKP claimed seven attacks against power pylons, and one attack against two fuel tankers since the Taliban takeover in 2021. The attack targeting the two fuel tankers took place on 26 September 2021, and the last targeted attack against a power pylon occurred on 22 May 2022. On 20 April 2024, ISKP claimed responsibility, via its Telegram channels, for another attack in Kabul. According to the group’s statement, a “sticky bomb” attached to a vehicle transporting Shias exploded while it was passing a Taliban checkpoint, “killing and wounding over 10.” Quoting Khalid Zadran, the Spokesman of the Kabul Police Command, ToloNews confirmed the incident, reporting that “a sticky mine planted in a Mercedes-type car exploded in the Kuta Sangi area.” Zadran added: “Unfortunately, the driver lost his life in this incident and three other civilians were injured.” AW geolocated images showing the aftermath of the explosion, as can be seen below. The attack took place along ​​Pul-e-Sokhta Road, in Kabul’s Police District 6 (PD6), a Hazara-majority area, just north of the ​​Pul-e-Sokhta bridge. Figure: AW investigators geolocated images showing the aftermath of an explosion targeting a minibus carrying civilians in Kabul’s PD6, a Hazara-majority area [34.507699, 69.117101] According to international humanitarian organisation Emergency NGO, which operates out of Kabul, providing high quality healthcare to people affected by war and poverty, four people wounded in the attack were brought to their surgical centre. User-generated images , shared on X (formerly Twitter) indicate heavy damage to the minibus. However, AW did not confirm any casualties following the explosion. ISKP previously claimed an attack along ​​Pul-e-Sokhta Road in August 2022, only metres from the attack claimed on 20 April 2024. The previous attack , claimed on 6 August 2022, also targeted a minibus; in this incident, however, the explosion resulted in several casualties. The explosion on 20 April 2024 occurred near the entrance of the Dasht-e-Barchi area, and the main Shaheed Mazari Road, which runs through the area. Since August 2021, ISKP has claimed multiple attacks targeting minibuses in this area, the most recent of which took place on 6 January 2024, also along Shaheed Mazari Road. Attack on a Shia mosque in Herat On 29 April 2024, ISKP claimed responsibility, via its Telegram channels, for an attack targeting a Shia mosque in the Guzara district in Herat, located south of Herat city. According to the statement, the mosque was targeted with gunfire. According to Ministry of Interior Affairs Spokesman Abdul Mateen Qani, the attack killed six people and injured one in the Shia Imam Zaman Mosque. Local media reported that Mullah Javid, the imam of the mosque, was among the casualties. AW collected user-generated footage, shared on social media, allegedly showing several victims of the attack inside a mosque. Based on this footage, AW confirmed at least five deceased individuals, including a child, with visible blood. However, AW was unable to independently verify the location of the attack, the victims’ identities, or causes of death. This attack marks the first claimed ISKP attack in the province since March 2023, when Mohammad Nader Kaka, the Director of Herat city’s Department of Water Supply, was assassinated. AW note, however, that Herat experienced a series of three unclaimed, targeted killings of Shia scholars between 22 October 2023 and 1 December 2023. ISKP did not claim any of the attacks, however, a Taliban raid on a suspected ISKP cell in Herat, allegedly linked to these killings, suggests ISKP involvement in these killings. Since April 2022, ISKP has refrained from claiming attacks targeting Shias in Herat. The group’s modus operandi in the province often includes targeting government workers in the centre of Herat city. After a lull in activity, ISKP has conducted a diverse array of attacks in multiple provinces of Afghanistan. With a suicide bombing in Kandahar; an explosion targeting the Taliban in Kunar; attacks on critical infrastructure and Shias in Kabul; and an attack on a Shia mosque in Herat, ISKP has demonstrated that periods of inactivity do not necessarily indicate an abscene of the group in Afghanistan. Share

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Media environment: Two outlets suspended and other journalists arrested The Afghan media landscape has been under sustained pressure since the Taliban takeover, with the closure of two TV channels linked to political parties and a series of journalist detentions in recent weeks, indicating the Taliban's ongoing efforts to control the media landscape. 13 May 2024 Photo: © Afghan Witness The Afghan media environment has massively changed since the Taliban seized power in August 2021. Although the Taliban did not repeal the Mass Media Law or the Access to Information Law , enacted by the former Afghan government, the de facto authorities issued 17 directives between 18 August 2021 and 24 February 2024, contradicting these laws and imposing restrictions on media and journalists. According to the Afghanistan Journalists Centre (AFJC), over the last solar year alone (late March 2023 - late March 2024), the Taliban detained 59 journalists and media staff. Similarly, AW recorded the alleged detention of 132 journalists and media personnel between 15 January 2022 and 31 March 2024 in Afghanistan. Moreover, citing Afghanistan National Journalists Union, in March 2023, Tolo News reported that since the Taliban takeover, 50% of media outlets had closed down, and 53% of media workers had lost their jobs. A lack of funding and financial resources are among the most common reasons for the shrinking media landscape in the country, along with the Taliban’s censorship, restrictions, and ongoing persecution of media workers. Closure of two TV channels affiliated with two political parties On 16 April 2024, Amu TV and the Taliban-run Bakhar News Agency (BNA) posted remarks from two members of the Media Complaints and Rights Violations Commission, which announced the “temporary suspension” of Barya TV and Noor TV, for not adhering to “national and Islamic principles and values and journalistic principles.” In footage shared online, two members of the Commission, Head of Tolo News Zabiullah Sadat and President of the Afghanistan Journalists Union Hafizullah Barakzai, speaking in Pashto and Farsi respectively, said the decision was made that day at the Commission meeting, and noted that both media outlets will remain closed until a court decree permitted them to reopen. Noor TV was established in 2007 , and is affiliated with Salahuddin Rabbani, the Head of the Jamiat-e-Islami party. AW has noted that despite the channel's closure, its website and YouTube account remain accessible; however, the last show was posted on 16 April 2024. The channel appeared to have complied with the Taliban’s restrictions concerning the appearance of female journalists on air – the programmes available on its YouTube channel mostly consisted of male journalists and commentators, while women guests and commentators appeared wearing facemasks. The channel, however, referred to the Taliban as “the caretaker government” instead of “the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan”, the language that is used by Tolo News and other media outlets. The Taliban reportedly issued a directive in September 2021, requesting the media refer to them as “the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan.” AW investigators also noted that Noor TV reported on the International Women Peace Security Forum, conducted in Kosovo on 15 April 2024, in which the Government of Kosovo awarded Afghan women activists a Courage Award . AW assesses that the coverage of such an event is controversial, as the awardees were members of the women’s protest movement; the Taliban has clamped down on this movement, and reportedly prevented several women from travelling to Kosovo to attend the event. Barya TV channel was reportedly established in 2019 , and is owned by the Hizb-e Islami leader Gulbuddin Hekmatyar . Unlike Noor TV, Barya TV’s website is no longer accessible, as shown below. Figure: Screenshot of a message on the Barya TV website saying the website has been suspended. Barya TV’s YouTube channel’s most recent post also dates to 16 April 2024. Meanwhile, Hizb-e Islami affiliates and supporters reportedly denounced the closure, referring to the recent friction and discontent between the Taliban and Hekmatyar as the main reason behind it. Daily Shahadat , another Hizb-e Islami media outlet, also reacted to Barya TV’s suspension on its website and X account. On 22 April 2024, Daily Shahadat posted a sarcastic caption on X, with a link to its website: “The decision of the government of the Islamic Emirate of the Taliban: Tolo TV is a television committed to Islam and the country's national values. Barya TV is not a television committed to Islam and the country's national values. Thus, Barya TV is banned.” Tolo TV , Tolo News , and several other media and communication companies are sister entities under the MOBY Group , founded and owned by Saad Mohseni. Tolo TV and Tolo News were two of the most renowned TV channels with a liberal point of view prior to the Taliban takeover. Following the takeover, however, the channels have changed, and demonstrate staunch compliance with the Taliban’s media policies, restrictions, and censorship. On 23 April 2024, Shahadat Daily shared another post disparaging Tolo, and questioned the Taliban’s shutdown of Barya TV, with a caption that read: “The Headquarters of Tolo TV, a branch of the MOBY Group, is located in Israel.” The Taliban closed Noor TV and Barya TV two weeks after Minister of Justice Abdul Hakim Sharai stressed the Taliban’s ban on political parties in a press conference. Sharai said: “According to Taliban law, even using the word ‘party’ is a crime.” Concurrently, on 7 April 2024, the Taliban’s Ministry of Justice announced the referral of two political parties and 75 charitable organisations for investigation, due to “illegal activities.” Detention of four journalists in Ghazni and Khost provinces Taliban intelligence services reportedly detained Habibur Rahman Taseer, a Radio Azadi reporter, in Ghazni province on 6 April 2024. According to the AFJC, the Taliban relocated Taseer to Ghazni Provincial Prison after he spent 12 days in their intelligence detention centre. Amid condemnation of the detention, Hadullah Nisar, the Taliban’s Head of the provincial department of the Ministry Information and Culture in Ghazni, claimed Taseer was detained for “insulting Islamic sanctities and values,” rather than for his work as a journalist. On 18 April 2024, the Hindokush Ghag, a pro-Taliban media outlet, published a voice clip attributed to Taseer, in which he curses a mullah, “his mosque, madrasa and those who go to the mosque.” AW investigators observed pro-Taliban accounts sharing the audio widely on social media. Meanwhile, sources told Afghanistan International that the Taliban detained Taseer for his work, and had obtained the voice message from his WhatsApp account after confiscating his phone and other devices. The Taliban removed the Radio Azadi radio from the airwaves in December 2022 and subsequently restricted access to its website in Afghanistan in February 2023. On 21 April 2024, the Taliban reportedly detained three journalists in Khost province for allegedly answering women’s calls and playing music. In a letter issued in February 2024, the Taliban’s Ministry of Interior Affairs banned women from making calls to the media, stating that this was “immoral” and asking local media to abstain from engaging with female callers. According to AFJC and media reports , the three journalists, Ismail Sadat, Wahidullah Masoom, and Ehsanullah Tasal, worked for local radio stations, Naz , Iqra and Wolas Ghag , respectively. All three were reportedly detained by the Taliban’s provincial Department of Propagation of Virtue and Prevention of Evil. On 28 April 2024, the AFJC reported that the Taliban had released the three reporters. However, Radio’s Azadi’s Taseer remains in the Taliban detention and on 25 April 2024, Hamasa Media posted an update, stating that the Taliban had sentenced Taseer to two and a half years in prison. AW has been unable to verify this update, as this news has not been covered or confirmed by any other Afghan media or watchdog thus far. Conclusion The Afghan media environment has shrunk immensely since the Taliban takeover, with the de facto authorities censoring the media, imposing restrictions, and detaining media staff and journalists. The Taliban’s recent closure of two TV channels, owned by two major Afghan political parties, adds another layer of complexity to the Taliban’s crackdown on media and political opponents. The ongoing detention of journalists demonstrates the Taliban’s scrutiny of Afghanistan’s media environment, and that they are actively monitoring media and journalists for violations of directives. This monitoring appears to be mainly carried out by the intelligence services, provincial departments of the Ministry of Information and Culture and the Ministry of Propagation of Virtue and Prevention of Evil. Share