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Surge in female suicides linked to forced marriages, Taliban violence, and arrests Documenting 195 cases of suicide since April 2022, AW has observed a rise in female suicides since the Taliban seized power in 2021, and identified a pattern suggesting that ethnic minorities appear to make up a disproportionate share of the reported cases 26 Feb 2024 Photo: © Afghan Witness, 2022 WARNING: This report contains links to graphic imagery, reference to suicide, and descriptions of physical and sexual abuse There have been at least 195 cases of suicide in Afghanistan since April 2022, according to data compiled by AW [1] . Suicide cases in Afghanistan appear to rise each year, possibly linked to the escalating economic crisis , unemployment , domestic violence , forced marriage , mental health disorders , Taliban restrictions , and Taliban-related violence and human rights violations . AW observations in reported suicides: April 2022-today AW found that suicides were most often recorded among Afghan women, but that they were also common among men, as well as female and male minors, recording an age range of 10 to 72 . Although hanging was the post prevalent method of suicide recorded by AW, other methods recorded include gunshot injuries , poisonings , narcotics overdoses , self-immolation , and throwing oneself to one’s death. However, there were a number of cases in which the age, sex of the victim, and means of self-harm were not provided. While unemployment appears to significantly contribute to suicide among young Afghan men, causes of suicides among women are multifaceted. In reports, female suicides are frequently listed as stemming from domestic violence, an increase in early and forced marriages , Taliban-related violence such as rape , detention , and Taliban-imposed restrictions – including bans on education and the closure of universities and schools. AW analysts also observed a recent trend of women committing suicide following their release from Taliban prisons in Kabul and Balkh. It is highly likely that AW data does not capture a considerable share of suicide incidents, due to societal stigma and limited reporting of individual events, whereas media outlets on the ground have provided significantly higher figures. For example, Etilaatroz reported 213 suicides between 21 April 2022 and 21 April 2023 alone. AW analysts were unable to independently verify this figure, however it too likely also represents an undercount of the true scale of the problem. In this report, Etilaatroz listed Faryab, the predominantly Uzbek province, as the location with the highest rates of suicide in Afghanistan; this aligns with data collected by AW. The impact on Faryab province was further highlighted by the former provincial governor, who told Zawia News there had been 22 suicide cases in the province between 22 May 2023 and 21 June 2023. Suicides related to early and forced marriage Suicides are notoriously underreported, and those among minors in Afghanistan are particularly difficult to monitor. However, as forced marriages are on the rise in Afghanistan as a result of economic pressure (according to the United States Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction ) , it is likely that related suicides are similarly witnessing an uptick. Accordingly, AW has tracked claims of 11 suicides related to forced marriages of underage girls since April 2022. On 20 January 2024, Zan TV posted on X (formerly Twitter): “Local sources in Baghlan province say that a young girl in the Deh Salah district of the province committed suicide due to forced marriage.” The victim was 17 and had been married to a 37-year-old man four months prior. It was further reported that she had previously made several unsuccessful attempts on her life, following the marriage. Not two weeks later, on 2 February 2024, a local journalist in Faryab posted about the suicide of another 17-year-old girl on Facebook . According to Rokhshana Media , which also reported on the incident, this girl committed suicide after strongly opposing a marriage that her father approved. Suicides related to Taliban violence and arrests AW has also observed a recent trend in claims of female suicides relating to Taliban violence, following arrests and detention. In the wake of the Taliban's campaign arresting women and girls for noncompliance with the hijab in January 2024, AW recorded various [WARNING: GRAPHIC] claims of suicide , which were supported by on the ground reports gathered by credible organisations, relating to experiences of Taliban violence and imprisonment. On 28 January 2024 several social media accounts also shared [WARNING: GRAPHIC] pictures of women who had been released from Taliban prisons with signs of torture. Activist Bibi Gul, who used the pseudonym Zahra Mohammadi, underwent a similar experience before committing suicide on 22 December 2023. According to the Unity and Solidarity of Afghanistan Women’s Movement , the organisation with which she was affiliated, Bibi Gul initially arrested in September 2021 and had been contemplating suicide ever since. Also in connection to women’s detentions, on 28 January 2024, Exile TV posted a video of a woman on X, a mother of a one-year-old, who was allegedly arrested by the Taliban and sexually assaulted. She said that she had contemplated suicide as a result of the trauma that she suffered, but refrained for the sake of her child. She added, however, that if she were to follow through on her thoughts of self harm, that she would kill both herself and her child. Sexual assault and gender-based violence in the Taliban’s female detention centres has been well reported by Afghan media. On 7 February 2024, 8am media reported on women’s experience in Taliban detention centres in three northeastern provinces. This report detailed sexual violence including gangrape, and hitting women’s genitals with pipes and brooms. The same outlet reported on similar issues in female detention centres in Samangan, Faryab and Jowzjan provinces in May 2023, alleging that 16 out of 90 women who were imprisoned became pregnant as a result of repeated sexual assault. Societal stigma leads to underreporting of suicide and its motivations While motives for suicide vary, open source information often lists the rationale for reported suicides as " unknown ” . Based on AW data, domestic violence appears to be the most common driver of suicides among women in Afghanistan. However, many reports, including those in the media, also point to " family disputes ," " family problems , " and " mental health issues " . According to 8am media , families in Afghanistan often deny allegations of suicide, to avoid cultural stigmas, whilst others request further investigations and autopsies to determine their relative’s cause of death. Crucially, there have also been reports that the Taliban has prevented autopsies and further investigations from taking place in instances of probable suicide. Conclusion Overall there are investigative and forensic gaps concerning open-source suicide reports at large in Afghanistan. Cultural and social stigmas surrounding suicide lead to a culture of secrecy, which further benefits from a lack of Taliban cooperation in providing data on the incidence of suicide. Past alleged suicide cases also reveal possible Taliban interference, hindering autopsies and forensic evaluations. Family involvement in the aftermath of Taliban detentions and related violence, for the purpose of restoring honour to the family must also be taken into account. This contextual basis, coupled with insufficient evidence, makes it challenging to ascertain whether individual cases are femicides, murders, or actual suicides. Regardless, the primary victims of these ongoing cases are most often women, including female minors. The increasing levels of women's suicides or suicidal inclinations, particularly correlating with Taliban violence, imprisonment, and restrictions, suggest that women are suffering at the hands of the de facto authorities, and continue to suffer physical and psychological injuries following their release. [1] AW began monitoring suicides in Afghanistan in April 2022. Share

​ ​ 26 Feb 2024

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​ ​ 28 Feb 2024

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Taliban measure to enrol women in public medical institutes promoted by bot-like social media accounts The news that female graduates would be allowed to apply to study in public medical institutes in 11 provinces has been heavily promoted by social media accounts, some of which display bot-like behaviour 28 Feb 2024 Photo: © Afghan Witness, October 2022 On 20 February, the Taliban Directorate of Government Dailies website published an article announcing that female graduates who had completed high school were able to apply to study in public medical institutes in the upcoming academic year. This announcement followed a letter , sent by the Ministry of Public Health to provincial directors of public health in Kapisa, Parwan, Panjshir, Maidan Wardak, Ghazni, Paktika, Logar, Khost, Badakhshan, Bamyan and Paktia, directing them to begin recruiting female graduates of the 12th grade for health institutes; the letter was dated 9 February 2024. Bot-like behaviour disseminating the news. Bakhtar News Agency, a Taliban-controlled state outlet, posted about this decision on social media, attracting the attention of numerous pro-Taliban users. Despite the account deleting their initial post about the letter shortly after it was published, its content was still used by dozens of social media users to spread the news. Within the first 24 hours, at least 49 accounts posted the identical text alongside the image initially shared by Bakhtar News Agency across X, displaying bot-like behaviour. Figure: Examples of two accounts amplifying the news in identical posts, from accounts displaying botlike behaviour on X. This amplification was also observed on Facebook, with numerous accounts sharing the identical content with their followers. This behaviour persisted throughout the 21 and 22 February 2024, on both social media platforms. Although it was possible to detect some organic engagement , it was clear the message was being pushed by large numbers of pro-Taliban bot accounts, a behaviour previously observed and reported by AW. In addition to the main message, some accounts added their own mark of approval in the form of “ clapping ” or “ 100 ” emojis, as can be seen below. Figure: Pro-Taliban bot accounts promoting the news with emojis showing approval. On 19 February, the day before Bakhtar published the announcement, an account claiming to be Sonia Niazi , a female TOLO news presenter, also promoted the decision. The account shared a photo of the decree on X and Facebook , with a message in Pashto that said: “Step by step to solve all problems.” The same content and photos were then observed being copy-pasted by multiple pro-Taliban accounts on X – many displaying bot-like behaviour – in an attempt to amplify the perceived support for the decision. Other accounts with female profile pictures that actively share pro-Taliban content were also observed on both on X and Facebook promoting the measure. In addition to “Niazi”, a couple other users claiming to be Afghan female news reporters also shared and amplified the content with their thousands of followers on X. AW note that there is no way to confirm whether these accounts are indeed run by women, or whether they are accounts run by men, using female profile pictures in an attempt to portray a female perspective. Official Taliban support Taliban officials have so far remained silent on the issue. Wardak Al-Hafani, an account claiming to work for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, posted about the upcoming changes to girls medical education to his more than 104K followers on X. Al-Hafani has consistently supported the image that the Taliban care about girls' education, even prior to the take-over. In December 2020 the account posted : “The IEA is committed to providing high quality education in accordance with Islamic affairs and in accordance with the culture of Afg to all its male & female citizens.” In March and December 2022, when the administration prevented girls from accessing education beyond the sixth grade, and later banned female students from attending university, Hafani reassured his followers that these decisions were only temporary . He said: “Once the issue of specific hijab is resolved,” women and girls will be allowed to study again. AW has been unable to confirm the identity of the person responsible for this account. The profile image shows a photo of Mohammad Naeem Wardak, the spokesperson of the Taliban's Political Office in Qatar. It has been suggested by BBC Monitoring that the Al-Hafani account is a backup for Wardak. Possible reason for the promotion of the new measure It is possible that the Taliban approved and amplified the measure ahead of the meeting of Special Envoys on Afghanistan in Doha, Qatar, as a move to demonstrate the group was making progress on girls’ education (and to pre-empt the anticipated criticism on the topic). The UN-led meeting, which took place over 18 and 19 February, brought together envoys from 25 countries, the EU, the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, as well as representatives from Afghan civil society, to discuss the evolving situation in Afghanistan, since the Taliban’s takeover, and possible avenues for international engagement with the regime. The Taliban did not send a special envoy to the meeting, as the group objected to the participation of other representatives from Afghanistan, claiming that their participation would be “unbeneficial” if the UN did not see them as the sole representatives of Afghanistan. Moreover, the Taliban also demanded a meeting with the UN Secretary-General, which Antonio Guterres claimed would “to a large extent” amount to recognition of the regime, a position the UN was unprepared to take. Instead, a UN undersecretary-general for political and peacebuilding affairs met separately with a representative from the Taliban’s political office in Doha. The conference ended with consensus on goals that the Taliban must meet – including women and girls’ right to education – but limited progress on how the international community should engage with Afghanistan’s de facto authorities. Another possible reason behind the announcement to allow women and girls to enrol in public medical institutes across 11 provinces was the desire to minimise clashes between differing viewpoints within the Taliban community. In October 2023 a group of Afghans and human rights activists used AI-generated images depicting women and girls being treated my male doctors, going against traditional Afghan customs and sensibilities. The campaign aimed to urge the Taliban to allow women and girls to study medicine, in order to fulfil essential roles and maintain Afghan customs in society. Whilst there were a few vocal opponents , some pro-Taliban users with significant follower counts on X were observed supporting the initiative. However, AW note that, despite the recent announcement to permit enrolments in selected provinces, there was no evidence to suggest they could not already do so. On 18 November 2023, Abdul Bari Omar, the Acting Head of Afghanistan National Food and Drug Administration, shared a video clip from his trip to Cologne, Germany, in which he claims that medical institutes remained open for women and girls in Afghanistan. In the clip, he also says that 40 percent of the Ministry of Public Health’s staff members were women. AW has been unable to confirm this statistic. Share

​ ​ 27 Feb 2024

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'Playing on both sides': Russian manoeuvring in Afghanistan on the rise Over the past few months, Russia’s manoeuvring on Afghanistan appears to have increased, with indications of rising engagement with both Taliban and anti-Taliban forces. 27 Feb 2024 Image: Moscow, Russia via Canva On 22 December 2023, the Russian Chamber of Commerce and Industry hosted a roundtable on two years of Taliban rule, inviting representatives of the Russian Foreign Ministry, interregional diaspora, political scientists, cultural experts, ethnographers, and businesspeople. Importantly, among the guests were several ‘political technologists’ who have played important roles in Russia’s information and influence operations overseas, including Maxim Shugalei and Yulia Ber (née Afanasieva). Both were key on-the-ground operators for Evgeny Prigozhin’s Wagner Group in Africa and both sanctioned for their roles. Another participant, Alexander Prokofiev, has also been associated with the Wagner Group’s influence operations in Africa. Meanwhile another participant, Andrei Gromov, is head of the more secretive GR Group, which also plays a key role in Russian information operations in Africa. Shugalei has travelled to Kabul on several occasions, including shortly after the fall of Kabul, which was well documented by international media at the time, including The Washington Post , which described his trip in the following manner: “He was on a mission to promote the Kremlin’s interests. Oh, and also to undercut the United States wherever possible.” The other political technologists attending the roundtable, however, had no significant background on Afghanistan. The result of the roundtable – as set out in a memo shared by Shugalei – was the decision to create a draft resolution, proposing Russia lift sanctions against Afghanistan and recognise the Taliban government as legitimate. The memo also stated that Shugalei and Bogdan Deryabin, a psychologist and political technologist , would travel to Kabul in January 2024 with the intention of creating a working group with the Taliban on education and the implementation of education programmes (while respecting Afghan values and sovereignty). A month after the roundtable took place, on 22 January 2024, Shugalei posted on his Telegram channel that he was travelling to Kabul to conduct interviews with local residents, and build on similar research he conducted shortly after the fall of Kabul. He commented that since then, the Taliban “have managed to make significant progress in the country’s development”, adding “it’s interesting to talk to the people of Afghanistan yourself, to understand how the attitude towards the Taliban has transformed within the country”. The post was accompanied by a photograph of an interview guide. A video posted the following day showed the view from a vehicle window as it drove through the Karte Parwan area of Kabul. Figure: A photograph of the guide developed for interviews (in Russian) and a still from a video showing the Kabul Atlas Hospital in Karte Parwan (Location: 34.534785, 69.137811), both shared on Shugalei’s Telegram Interestingly, Shugalei claimed his trip was cut short. According to a 6 February 2024 update on his Telegram account: “The deployment ended faster than planned.” He added that “not everything planned was realised,” but noted that another trip would most likely happen again. About this future trip, he said: “We will be able to conduct high-quality research and share with you objective data about the situation in the country”. The Telegram post then provided Shugalei’s impressions of Kabul, which were largely positive. He said that the country was “moving in the right direction” and claimed that the “local residents had no fears of the Taliban.” It is also worth noting that he also said he was stopped at a checkpoint on the way to the airport, “despite having diplomatic plates.” This indicates that Shugalei’s trip was to some degree supported by Russia’s official in-country presence. Shugalei’s remarks on conducting “high quality research” and the interview guide he shared suggest he is carrying out focus groups and polling to inform potential communications work. He previously carried out similar work for the Wagner Group in various African countries, including Libya, Sudan, and Mali, as part of the Group’s support to governments or individuals in these countries; this kind of work also sought to inform Wagner communications strategies when entering a country. While there is no indication of active campaigns by Shugalei or Russia within Afghanistan yet, it is notable that Russia’s leading overseas influence experts have gathered on Afghanistan and declared an interest in seeking Taliban recognition. Russia’s opposition engagement and Saleh’s attack on US role in Afghanistan While the Kremlin’s arm’s length influence operators were discussing Afghanistan and recognition of the Taliban, Afghan opposition figures were becoming increasingly visible in Russia. On 22 January 2024 – the day Shugalei appeared to travel to Kabul – former Afghan politician and one-time First Vice President, Amrullah Saleh, gave an interview to Andrei Serenko, one of Russia’s leading experts on Afghanistan, which was published in the newspaper Nezavisimaya Gazeta . The interview, which was published under the title “Americans Have Put Kabul to Sleep with their Sweet Political Lies,” featured a series of highly critical comments on the US’ role in Afghanistan and the Taliban’s takeover. This interview appeared to be in line with the Russian strategy of needling the US over Afghanistan, using the Doha Agreement and related engagement with the Taliban to undermine the US’ credibility as an international actor. Summarising Saleh’s remarks, Serenko wrote: “Saleh calls Washington’s policy towards its Afghan ally treacherous and regrets that President Ashraf Ghani’s team, having become a hostage of American intrigues, missed the chance to save the country by refusing to support Russian initiatives in the field of the Afghan peace settlement.” In the interview, Saleh accused the US of replacing the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan with the Taliban in 2021. He linked what he calls “the secret deal” between the US and the Taliban, to reinstate Taliban rule in Afghanistan, to the US-Russia long-term rivalry and post-Crimea tensions between the two powers. He claimed that the US and the Taliban had been in weekly contact since 2014 and that Russia's annexation of Crimea was a catalyst in the US decision to leave Afghanistan. Saleh then provides details of his and President Ghani’s interactions with American authorities between 2015 and 2021. He said that he regrets the Republic’s blind trust in America, and the West in general. He admitted that ignoring regional peace initiatives, particularly those launched by Russia, parallel to America's Doha process, was a mistake. He said that the Republic lost the support of the regional countries by relying on the “political lies” of the Americans, leaving Afghanistan more vulnerable to manipulation by the US. It is worth noting that Saleh, a key member of the anti-Taliban National Resistance Front ( NRF ), has previously criticised the US-Taliban deal. On 20 October 2023, he accused the US of “gambling” its ethical and moral stance in signing the Doha Agreement with the Taliban, effectively labelling the group as “good terrorists,” for American geopolitical gain. Beyond providing a platform for Saleh, Russia has hosted various Afghan opposition figures in recent months. Ahmad Massoud, the leader of the NRF, met with Sergei Mironov, leader of the Just Russia Party, in late August , and again in late November to participate in the “Afghanistan Between the Past and theFuture” conference. Unconfirmed reports by Russian media suggest that Massoud and General Yasin Zia were in Moscow in December 2023 and January 2024. Share

​ ​ 19 Feb 2024

Passport offices reopening leads to significant overcrowding and subsequent reclosure With some having waited over a year for a new passport, the reopening of passport offices in Kabul led to several days of chaos. Their reclosure means Afghans seeking to exit the country must revert to the unreliable online application process. 19 Feb 2024 Image credit: Ariana Television On 9 January 2024, Abdul Karim Haseeb , the Taliban’s General Directorate of Passports, announced on X (formerly Twitter) that in-person registration and distribution of passports would open to the public in Kabul the following day. He said that while the online process of registering for passports had been running smoothly for the past year – a claim disputed by many users – the opening of physical offices would make it possible for those without internet access to apply for a passport. Additionally, he claimed that the passport department was planning to resume in-person registration in other provinces. However, some outlets reported this would only happen in the absence of excessive crowding. Following the announcement, crowds amassed near the passport office in Kabul, as well as in other provinces, including Herat , Helmand , Wardak , Bamiyan and Samangan , demonstrating the eagerness of the Afghan public to obtain valid travel documents. Disruptions possibly also occurred in Faryab and Paktia , due to the posting of special schedules to register for a passport in-person. Ariana News , an Afghan news channel, shared a video of a reporter talking to people queuing outside the Kabul passport office. The footage shows thousands of people lined up for hundreds of metres; armed Taliban members and vehicles can also be seen. Figure: Large queues of people waiting outside the Kabul passport office [34.500625, 69.138164]. Mass overcrowding indicates desire for emigration Various news organisations reported on the queues outside the Kabul passport office and people’s motivations for attempting to obtain a new passport. One issue that was highlighted was access to international employment. One Kabul resident told the Exile TV Network : “I will say goodbye to this country forever. There is no job opportunity here, and I feel like a prisoner here. They would not issue your passport easily. You saw that around 80,000 people had come here to get a passport.” Another key issue that Kabul residents raised was the Taliban’s ban on women's education. Afghanistan International and Aamaj News both received and shared videos showing that many of those queuing outside the Kabul passport office were women. Many of these women had reportedly camped overnight or arrived in the early morning. Moreover, RFE/RL interviewed a woman who said she was trying to travel abroad so that she could study internationally; she said that she had been trying to acquire a passport since last year. Reports of poor conditions and Taliban using violence to disperse crowds Tolo News reported that passport applicants claimed that severe overcrowding, long queues, and cold weather resulted in some applicants dying while trying to obtain a passport. An anonymous eyewitness, quoted by 8am media , said that they had seen the bodies of three women who had died while trying to obtain a passport; the outlet also reported that people had been trampled to death. AW has been unable to verify these claims. There have also been claims of the Taliban using violence to disperse crowds. In one video, a Taliban member can be seen beating people on the street, thought to be passport applicants, with a stick. Although the video appears to be recent, AW investigators were unable to verify the video; however AW investigators note that alleged Taliban members have been seen using similar tactics against passport applicants in the past. Another video was accompanied by claims that the Taliban used tear gas in an attempt to disperse the crowd in Kabul. However, AW investigators believe that, based on the spread of the gas cloud, crowd behaviour, and the stream of gas turning on and off [1] , the device being used was likely a fire extinguisher. Additional accusations of corruption and cronyism adding to delays Amid the chaos, there were also allegations of cronyism at the passport offices, with some applicants claiming that those with acquaintances within the General Directorate of Passports received preferential treatment. For example, in Kabul, one passport applicant claimed : “Passports were being distributed to people who had acquaintances inside the directorate and they were identified and prioritised from the end of the line and those who although they were standing at the top of the line but had no friends and acquaintance, they could not get a passport.” Moreover, an applicant in Samangan claimed: “Only people who have money can get a passport.” The Taliban have also been accused of throwing out passport application forms. A video posted on X shows women trying to recover their application forms that were submitted to the passport office, but were allegedly subsequently discarded by Taliban staff members. Despite these claims, Abdul Matin Qanunii , the spokesperson of the General Directorate of Passports, denied all allegations of corruption in relation to the reopening of in-person passport offices. Reclosure leaves options for exit limited After eleven days of overcrowding, and passport offices across several provinces being overwhelmed, the Taliban’s General Directorate of Passports announced that in-person registration for passports would close as of 21 January 2024. The announcement said that passports would still be issued to people who apply online, and that additional capacity would be added across the country, including by opening four more passport offices in Kabul. This is significant as it means a return to the previous online application method which had proved slow and unreliable, restricting people’s ability to leave the country, to emigrate for work and education, and to travel. Moreover, the return to online services disproportionately impacts poorer and more rural groups who lack access to the internet. Overall, the reopening and subsequent overcrowding at passport offices suggests that the Taliban likely underestimated the demand for in-person passport services; as a result, the de facto authorities lacked capacity to effectively manage residents’ eagerness to secure travel documents, and returned to a more restricted means of administering passport registration and distribution services. [1] Tear gas canisters cannot be turned on and off. Share

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